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UKRAINE, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND 
EMERGING NORMS FOR UNILATERAL 




In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved, devolving from a single political 
entity into 15 discrete independent republics.1 Following the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, several breakaway movements emerged in post-Soviet 
states: Chechnya and Dagestan in Russia,2 South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 
Georgia,3 Transnistria in Moldova,4 Artsakh (also called Nagorno-
Karabakh) between Azerbaijan and Armenia,5 and, most recently, Crimea, 
Donetsk, and Lugansk in Ukraine.6 Many of these conflicts have persisted 
for decades.7 
                                                        
1   See GLENN E. CURTIS & LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, RUSSIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 109-118 
(1998). Although the breakup of the Soviet Union was a process characterized by several individual 
declarations of independence, the Union was formally disbanded by agreements between the leaders of 
constituent Soviet Republics at summits in Minsk and Almaty which “created the Commonwealth of 
Independent States [(“CIS”)] and annulled the 1922 union treaty that had established the Soviet 
Union.” Id. at 118. The Minsk summit was attended only by representatives from Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus; the Almaty summit was attended by 11 former Soviet republics, excluding the Baltic states 
and Georgia. Alma-Ata Declaration, http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=178 (Russian language; 
includes the assent of representatives from Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Belarus, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Moldova.) 
2   See Max Fisher, 9 Questions About Chechnya and Dagestan You Were Too Embarrassed to 
Ask, WASHINGTON POST, April 19, 2013, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/19/9-questions-about-chechnya-and-
dagestan-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/ (indicating that the conflicts in Chechnya and Dagestan 
ignited because “when the Soviet Union dissolved and its various regions either seceded or negotiated 
their place in the new Russian Federation, Moscow's talks with Chechen representatives fell apart.”) 
3   See Bruno Coppieters, The Roots of the Conflict, in ACCORD: A QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
18, 18 (Conciliation Resources, 1999) (providing a historical account of Georgia’s rescissions of 
certain Soviet policies favoring “national minorities,” including Ossetians and Abkhazians, as inciting 
incidents for those conflicts). 
4   See Mihály Borsi, Transnistria – An Unrecognized Country Within Moldova, SEER: 
JOURNAL FOR LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS IN EASTERN EUROPE, vol. 10, no. 4, 2007, at 45, 45 
(characterizing tension between Transnistria and Moldova as “a ‘frozen conflict’” resulting from 
Transnistria’s “declar[ation of] independence from Moldova after the collapse of the USSR on 27 
August 1991.”). 
5   See GLENN E. CURTIS & LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, AND GEORGIA: 
COUNTRY STUDIES 18-25 (1995) (discussing the growing attitudes of Armenian revanchism and 
Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalism within the greater context of the decline and collapse of the 
USSR). 
6   See Robert Malley, Ukraine Is Ground Zero for the Crisis Between Russia and the West, THE 
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2018) (reporting generally on the history of the Ukraine conflict, including both 
the Donbass and Crimea, from 2014 onward). 
7   See supra notes 4-8. With the exception of the Ukrainian conflicts, these breakaway 
movements erupted in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Id. 












Although each of these separatist movements – known as “frozen 
conflicts”8 – arose from different sets of geographic, political, and ethnic 
grievances,9 they pose a common problem: how can international law 
evaluate the validity of these breakaway movements? Although 
international law has addressed issues raised by secessionist movements in 
the past, unilateral secessions by non-colonized states or proto-states raise 
peculiar factual and legal issues.10 Frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet 
sphere implicate different factual, historical, and legal questions without 
the benefit of righting an unambiguous historical wrong.11 
This note focuses on the possibility of legal justification under 
international law for secession by two proto-states in Eastern Ukraine 
presently locked in frozen conflicts: the Donetsk People’s Republic 
(“DPR”) and Lugansk People’s Republic (“LPR”).12 Although there are 
differences between them which may have material effects on their legal 
claims to statehood,13 both regions share significant linguistic, 
demographic, cultural, and historical traits which put their broader claims 
                                                        
8   See Dov Lynch, Frozen Conflicts, THE WORLD TODAY, vol. 57, no. 8/9, 2001, at 36 
(explaining that these post-Soviet territorial conflicts are “frozen conflicts” because they are “conflicts 
frozen in time,” unresolved “almost a decade on” from the fall of the Soviet Union).  
9   See supra notes 4-8. Although each conflict has grown out of the collapse of central Soviet 
control, they evince a varied set of casus bellorum and would require varying legal analyses as a result. 
10  See Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-colonial Secession and the Criteria for Statehood in 
International Law, 41 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 1, 5 (proposing that different criteria apply to the validity of 
“Unilateral Non-Colonial” secessions (“UNC”) than colonial secessions.) 
11  See id. at 17-22 (discussing the principle of uti possidetis juris as applicable to the secessions 
of postcolonial states, but not necessarily to noncolonial secessions). Uti possidetis juris is a legal 
principle which maintains the pre-existing administrative borders of a region when it gains 
independence so that “where there is a withdrawal of sovereignty over an administrative territory, the 
territorial boundaries attached thereto are protected, final, and permanent.” Id. Application of the 
principle to noncolonial secession is controversial. The Badinter Commission, an arbitral commission 
established by the European Community, cited the principle in its determination that “Yugoslavia's 
internal federal borders became international borders following the secession of four of the federation's 
republics in the early 1990s.” Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis 
of the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 Melbourne U. L.R. 50, 50 (2000.) 
However, some international legal scholars argue that uti possidetis juris was misapplied in that case 
and constitutes a general principle of international law only in the context of decolonization. See 
Radan, 24 Melbourne U. L.R. 50, 59-65 (discussing the development of uti possidetis in the context of 
Latin American independence movements and challenging the Badinter Commission’s application of 
the principle to former Yugoslav states.) 
12  Some sources may refer to these entities as the “DNR” and “LNR” respectively, as the 
Russian word for “people’s,” “Наро́дная” (“Narodnaya,”) begins with an N. See, e.g., Donetskaya 
Narodnaya Respublika: Ofitsialniy Site, https://dnr-online.ru/ (Using the “DNR” romanization for the 
URL in the capacity of the DPR’s official website.) 













for sovereign legitimacy on similar footing and merit side-by-side 
analysis.14 
Part I of this note focuses on the historical background of the Donbass15 
region, the origins of the current conflict, and the current status of the 
secessionist states in Donetsk and Lugansk. 
Part II of this note examines current and emerging international law 
norms concerning statehood, the right of self-determination, state rights to 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, and secession from non-colonial 
parent states. This section aims to distill from scholarly consensus and 
state practice an intelligible rubric to evaluate proto-state claims to a right 
of unilateral secession. 
Part III of this note applies the standards developed in Part II to the 
facts of the DPR and LPR secessions. This section evaluates two principal 
questions: whether the DPR and/or LPR meet prevailing criteria for 
statehood; and whether the secessions of these regions are supported by 
sound legal principles (extant or emerging) for the legitimacy of 
secessionist states. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DONBBASS CONFLICT AND ITS 
CURRENT STATUS 
In late 2013, a major protest movement arose in Ukraine in response to 
a refusal by the ruling Party of Regions to sign a promised trade agreement 
with the European Union.16 The protests, termed “Euromaidan,” spurred 
the flight of then-president Viktor Yanukovych from the country,17 the 
election of a pro-European majority in parliament,18 and the withdrawal of 
                                                        
14  See generally Theodore H. Friedgut, Professional Revolutionaries in the Donbass: The 
Characteristics and Limitations of the Apparat, 27 CANADIAN SLAVONIC PAPERS NO. 3 284 ( 1985). 
15  “Donbass” (Russian) or “Donbas” (Ukrainian) refers to a region in eastern Ukraine and 
western Russia formed by the Donets River basin (thus “Донецкий бассейн” (“Donetskiy Bassein”) 
forming the portmanteau “Donbass”). In the context of Ukraine, “Donbass” is often used as a 
metonym for the territory, culture, and people of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. See Andrew Wilson, 
The Donbas Between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes, J. CONTEMP. 
HIST. Vol. 30, No. 2, April 1995, 265, at 267. 
16  See BBC, Ukraine Suspends Preparations for EU Trade Agreement (Nov. 21, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25032275 (reporting on the surprise vote against the EU 
trade deal) and BBC, Huge Ukraine Rally over EU Agreement Delay (Nov. 24, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25078952 (indicating that over 100,000 people gathered to 
protest in Kiev). 
17  See BBC, Ukraine Crisis: Timeline (13 November 2014) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-26248275 (noting Yanukovych’s disappearance from Ukraine on February 22, 2014). 
18  BBC, Ukraine Elections: Pro-Western Parties Set for Victory (27 October 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29782513. 












the Party of Regions from Ukrainian politics.19 Shortly after 
Yanukovych’s flight to Russia, counter-protest movements seized control 
of the eastern oblasts20 of Donetsk and Lugansk, a region known as the 
“Donbass.”21 In May of 2014, those oblasts held questionable referenda 
which purported to express Donbass residents’ intention to exercise 
control over that territory.22 Since that time, the region has remained 
largely under the control of the Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples’ 
Republics.23 
Prior to the late 19th century, the Donbass was an inhospitable steppe 
used primarily as a battlefield in the frequent clashes between Slavic and 
Turkic empires.24 The tumultuous history of the region and its subsequent 
rapid development as a mining center with a diverse imported population 
inculcated a frontier character of “freedom, militancy, violence, terror, 
[and] independence” which “transcend[s] the borders of Russia[] and 
Ukraine.”25 When the Russian Empire industrialized the Donbass, it did so 
by importing Russian peasant labor and foreign investment capital.26 From 
this context emerged a unique cultural identity neither fully Ukrainian nor 
Russian.27 
                                                        
19  Id. 
20  Administrative divisions roughly equivalent to states or provinces; see supra note 1. 
21  Simon Denyer and Anna Nemstova, Eastern Ukrainians Vote for Self-Rule in Referendum 
Opposed by West, WASHINGTON POST (May 11, 2014) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraines-rebels-say-they-are-seeking-a-mandate-not-
independence-in-referendum/2014/05/11/ac02688a-d8dc-11e3-aae8-c2d44bd79778_story.html. 
22  Id. 
23  See generally BBC, supra note 20 (providing a timeline for the separatist conflict in the 
Donbass). 
24  See HIROAKI KUROMIYA, FREEDOM AND TERROR IN THE DONBAS: A UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN 
BORDERLAND, 1870S-1990S, 11-13 (Cambridge University Press 1998). Kuromiya notes that the 
preindustrial Donbass was known as the “wild steppe,” a vast sea of grass whose lack of naturally 
defensible terrain “made [it] a wild, dangerous area” and “a theater of continuous military operations.” 
Id. at 11. [Appears the published year is 1998, not 2003] 
25  Id. at 12. 
26  See Friedgut, supra note 17, at 284 (indicating that “The Donbass began to grow in the early 
1870s and was characterized by the concentration of thousands of workers in large metallurgy and 
mining enterprises financed and managed by non-Russian entrepreneurs.”) Friedgut notes that the 
rapid industrialization diversified the population from small pockets of Ukrainian villagers to include 
“Russian workers and miners [who] had been uprooted from their familiar surroundings and 
institutions,” Russian Jewish tradespeople seeking new opportunities within the Pale of Settlement, 
and “the foreign community of managers, foremen, and skilled workers” who funded and administered 
the industrial expansion but generally neither integrated into the community nor suffered the same 
deprived conditions as the workers. Id. at 285-86. 
27  See Paul S. Pirie, National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, 48 
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES NO. 7 1079 (1996). [Month doesn’t need to be included] Pirie finds that the 
population of the Donbass in particular evinces particularly low rates of self-identification with either 














As a result of this unique identity, the Donbass has historically been 
concerned with  administrative freedom and retention of a greater 
proportion of the industrial wealth generated in the region.28 Additionally, 
residents of the Donbass favored a political order which, though subject to 
Ukrainian sovereignty, maintained close ties with Russia economically, 
socially, and politically;29 Pirie notes that in the first national Ukrainian 
elections in 1994, “[t]he Donbass’ support for much closer ties with 
Russia” was confirmed by poll results in Donetsk and Lugansk on the 
question of joining the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS):30 
“88.7% of Donetsk voters and 90.7% of Lugansk voters” voted in favor of 
joining.31 
These attitudes—independence, apathy toward both Ukrainian and 
Russian nationalism, nostalgia for the unity and stability of the USSR, and 
a historical grudge against external rent-seeking on the Donbass’ industrial 
productivity32—all came to a head in the wake of President Yanukovych’s 
flight to Russia.33 Yanukovych is Donbass, born and bred: he grew up in 
Yenakievo, a Donbass city, where he reportedly “fell in with a street gang 
                                                                                                                              
the country’s western regions (even among mixed Ukrainian-Russian citizens) and Russian-
identification in Crimea. For example, in the 1970s, approximately 30% of married households in 
Ukraine were mixed Ukrainian-Russian; in the Donbass, that rate was 55%. Id. at 1086. Pirie also 
notes polls from 1991-1994 which indicate that a plurality of Donbass residents, 36.5%, consider 
themselves mixed Russian-Ukrainian (compared to 25-26% identifying as such across the nation) and 
that residents of Lugansk Oblast “defined the Donbass as a special community tied to both Russia and 
Ukraine, as opposed to a Ukrainian region.” Id. at 1087. 
28  For example, although “Donbass voted overwhelmingly for independence in 1991[,] [t]he 
region was partly voting (so people thought) for greater independence for the oblast … They wanted 
real socialism – greater control over their mines, the output and their lives in general.” Irina 
Predborska, Katya Ivaschenko, & Ken Roberts, Youth Transitions in East and West Ukraine, 20 
EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW NO. 5 403, 408-09 (2004). [Month doesn’t need to be included]  
29  See Pirie, supra note 30, at 1098-1100. 
30  The Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter “CIS”) is an international 
organization founded to promote political and economic cooperation among former Soviet states. See 
Alma-Ata Declaration, supra note 4. The Donbass’ enthusiasm for the CIS is particularly relevant in 
light of the possibility that the CIS is a vehicle for Russian hegemony in the region. See Paul Kubicek, 
The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Example of Failed Regionalism?, 35 REVIEW OF 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 237, 242-43 (2009) (Noting fears among CIS members that “Russian-led 
CIS ‘peacekeeping efforts’ were … viewed suspiciously by many as a means for Russia to re-insert 
itself in the post-Soviet space” and that “Russian claims that the CIS was in its sphere of influence … 
or that Russia had the right to intervene in CIS states to protect the rights of ethnic Russians made 
many uneasy about creating a security structure that would, because of power asymmetries, be 
dominated by Russia.”) [Month not needed] 
31  Pirie, supra note 30, at 1098. 
32  See generally id.  
33  See Ukraine Crisis: Protesters Declare Donetsk ‘Republic’, BBC, April 7, 2014, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26919928. 












and received two convictions for robbery and assault.”34 After the fall of 
the USSR, Yanukovych entered local politics and built the Party of 
Regions into a powerful regional political organization.35 His background 
as a political outsider and a Donbass native with a checkered past 
resonated with a Donbass that feared exploitation and forced 
Ukrainianization by the nationalistic, anti-Russian western part of the 
country.36 Donbass residents saw him “as ‘their guy,’ who would make 
decisions in their … best interest.”37 For the separatists in Donetsk and 
Lugansk, the Euromaidan revolution represented a decisive opening salvo 
against the interests of the Donbass, and the culmination of irrevocable 
differences in priorities over Ukraine’s future.38 
II. CURRENT AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS GOVERNING 
STATEHOOD, SECESSION, AND THE SELF-DETERMINATTION OF PEOPLES 
A. Statehood 
 
International legal consensus has largely rejected the “constitutive” 
theory of statehood, which posited that recognition by other states (or a 
                                                        
34  Stuart Williams, Ukraine's 'Orange villain' Seeks Last Laugh, The Telegraph, Jan. 12 2010, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6973451/Ukraines-Orange-villain-seeks-last-laugh.html. 
[the “at” not needed]. 
35  See Taras Kuzio, The Opposition’s Road to Success, 16 Journal of Democracy No. 2 117, 
124 (Apr. 2005) (reporting widespread allegations from Yanukovych’s opposition that Yanukovych 
“had maintained strong connections to organized crime … serving as its lobbyist in local and national 
government” and that “[h]e was closely linked to the Donetsk “clan” [of organized crime] and its 
leader, oligarch Rinat Akhmetov.”) In addition to his alleged connections to organized crime, 
Yanukovych benefited from a close political alliance with Leonid Kuchma, the second post-Soviet 
president of Ukraine. Id. 
36  Adam Taylor, Ukraine’s Real Problem is Viktor Yanukovych, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 31, 
2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines-real-problem-is-viktor-yanukovych-2014-1. See also 
infra note 41. 
37  Id. 
38  See, e.g., International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine 
March 14-26, 2014, (Apr. 5, 2014)., 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%
20of%20Ukraine,%20March%2014-26,%202014.pdf. The survey reveals significant pluralities in the 
East concerned about discrimination against Russian speakers and favoring of Russian intervention to 
protect Ukraine’s Russian population. Id. at 6, 8. The survey results also show a majority in the east 
favoring entrance to an economic customs union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan rather than the 
European Union. Id. at 12. Note that the “East” for this survey contains not only Donetsk and Lugansk, 
but also Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. Id. at 133. Though these oblasts have significant Russian-
speaking populations and saw pro-Yanukovych protests after Euromaidan, they did not join the 
breakaway oblasts and their responses may mitigate the anti-Kyiv attitudes represented by these 













community of other states) was necessary for statehood.39 In its place, 
international law has recognized a “declarative” theory of statehood, 
which defines states by “the exercise of effective power by an authority 
over a territorial community, and the representation of the community in 
its relations with like communities.”40 The Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States of 1933 articulated “the best-known 
formulation” of these “‘classical’ criteria for statehood.”41 In order to be a 
state, an entity must meet four criteria: “(a) a permanent population; (b) a 
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations 
with the other States.”42 Although these criteria are plainly-stated, they 
require nuanced case-by-case application; the specifics of their 




International law recognizes a right to self-determination of peoples.43 
By 1995, the International Court of Justice found the right to possess “an 
erga omnes character,” such that each state has an obligation toward the 
entire international community to support the right.44 The right is vaguely 
defined: the UN charter refers only to “the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples” as a basis for the “develop[ment] [of] 
                                                        
39  See James R. Crawford, State, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW at ¶ 44, (2011) (explaining that “Recognition is not a condition for statehood in international law. 
Rights under international law are not contingent upon the acceptance of the right-holder by individual 
others. An entity is not a State because it is recognized; it is recognized because it is a State.”). [Month 
not needed] 
40  Id. at ¶ 13. 
41  Id. 
42  Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International Conference 
of American States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. 
43  See Glen Anderson, A Post-Millennial Inquiry into the United Nations Law of Self-
Determination: A Right to Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession?, 49 Vand. J. Transnat’l. L. 1183, 1185 
(2016) (noting that “self-determination is widely regarded as a peremptory norm” among international 
law scholars). See also Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 114 (noting that 
“[t]he existence of the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in 
international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond "convention" and is 
considered a general principle of international law.”) [hereinafter Quebec] and International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (declaring that “[a]ll peoples 
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”). 
44  Case Concerning East Timor (Port. V. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30, 
1995). See also Jochen A. Frowein, Obligations Erga Omnes, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (explaining that erga omnes obligations “are ‘obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole’ which are ‘the concern of all States’ and for whose 
protection all States have a ‘legal interest’.”). 












friendly relations among nations.”45 A more robust definition appears in 
the UN “Friendly Relations Declaration” which indicates that the self-
determination of peoples includes “the right freely to determine, without 
external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”46 The vagueness of this formulation of 
the right may arise from its origins as a modern-era rejection of the divine 
right as a fundamental principle of state legitimacy.47 
Over time, the right of self-determination has been interpreted as two 
discrete rights: “internal self-determination,” or “the protection of minority 
rights within a state,” and “external self-determination,” or “secession 
from a state.”48 This distinction has a basis in the tension between the right 
of self-determination and “two core concepts of the euro-centric system of 
states: state sovereignty and territorial integrity.”49 A strictly-construed 
right to self-determination, would imply a right to on-demand secession by 
any “people.” This would undermine the principle of territorial integrity 
and subject state sovereignty over its territory to the constant threat of 
secession.50 
                                                        
45  U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
46  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970). See also G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960) 
[hereinafter “Friendly Relations Declaration”] (declaring that “All peoples have the right to self-
determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”). 
47  See Anderson, supra note 46, at 1192-1201. Anderson specifically reaches four conclusions 
about the right of self-determination: first, it is “is opposed to the divine right of kings”, conceiving of 
political authority “from the bottom-up, so to speak, rather than the top-down.” Id. at 1201. Second, 
“self-determination does not imply conservatism,” that is, political units are malleable to a certain 
(though undefined) extent. Id. Third, “self-determination is a progressive force that has challenged the 
political status quo throughout history.” Id. This progressive force, when applied to European 
hegemony over non-European peoples, “culminated in the movement against colonialism and 
ultimately, international recognition of the legality of UC secession.” Id. Fourth, self-determination is 
a durable concept in international law and “is unlikely to be expunged from the international legal 
landscape.” Id. at 1201-02. Anderson postulates that non-colonial secessionist movements, such as 
those in the post-Soviet sphere, will drive continued developments in the principle of self-
determination. Id.  
48  Mark A. Meyer et al., Mission to Moldova: Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the 
Separatist Crisis in Moldova: The Special Committee on European Affairs, 61 The Record (of the 
Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York) 196, 203 (2006). 
49  Ilya Berlin, thesis, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secessions: An Affirmation of the Right to Self-
Determination and a Legal Exception to the Use of Force in International Law p.30, Electronic Thesis 
and Dissertation Repository 4777, https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4777. 
50  See JOHN DUGARD, THE SECESSION OF STATES AND THEIR RECOGNITION IN THE WAKE OF 
KOSOVO 120 (2013) (indicating that “territorial integrity equals self-determination in terms of its legal 
credentials.”) However, respect for the territorial integrity of States may not be an international legal 













To protect the vital state interest in territorial integrity, international 
law considers “that the right to self-determination of a people is normally 
fulfilled through internal self-determination -- a people's pursuit of its 
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework 
of an existing state.”51 The 1970 UN Friendly Relations Declaration 
provides a rough definition of internal self-determination: it states that 
“[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free 
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into 
any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes 
of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.”52 
However, the Declaration also prohibits “authoriz[ation] or 
encourage[ment of] any action which would dismember or impair, totally 
or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described 
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.”53 
In short, a state which provides any form of internal self-determination 
cannot legally have its territorial integrity compromised on the basis of an 
alleged lack of self-determination.54 
Because adequate internal self-determination is “normally attainable 
within the framework of an existing state,”55 a legal claim to external self-
determination depends upon an abrogation of that right.56 Therefore, when 
a proto-state asserts a legal claim to secession, the inquiry is whether the 






                                                        
51  Quebec, supra note 46, at ¶ 126. 
52  Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 49. 
53  Id. 
54  See, e.g., Quebec, supra note 46, at ¶ 130 (asserting that a state’s territorial integrity remains 
protected by international law so long as it “represents the whole of the people or peoples resident 
within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the principles of 
self-determination in its own internal arrangements”). 
55  Id. 
56  See Anderson, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that “should a people within an existing state be 
denied their right to internal self-determination, then a right to external self-determination, or UNC 
secession, will arise.”). 
57  Id. 














As noted above, “principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity 
[which] have been regarded as relatively sacrosanct” limit the right to 
secession.58 A would-be secessionist people must show that it has been 
“blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination 
internally.”59 But what does that mean? Does international law broadly 
construe a people’s “right freely to determine, without external 
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development[,]”60 or are those inquiries narrowed in light of 
states’ strong interests in territorial integrity and sovereignty? 
Textual sources of international law imply conflicting standards for 
violations of internal self-determination. The language of the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, above, is quite broad – mandating the “free[] 
determin[ation]” of a people’s self-determination interests “without 
external influence.”61 But compare the findings of the League of Nations 
in The Aaland Islands Question, where the arbitral commission held that 
“geographical, economic and other similar considerations” could limit the 
“complete recognition” of the right to self-determination.62 Given States’ 
strong interests in preserving their territorial sovereignty, a more 
expansive definition of “internal self-determination” has emerged in order 
that “secession … be resisted whenever possible.”63 
The presumption against secession is rooted in the language of the 
Friendly Relations Declaration. The Friendly Relations Declaration finds 
adequate internal self-determination in a state which complies “with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and which is 
“possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to 
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.”64 The last 
clause makes clear that states whose governments represent the whole 
people of the territory without abrogating “meaningful access to 
                                                        
58  Anderson, supra note 46, at 1191. 
59  Quebec, supra note 46, at ¶ 134. 
60  Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 16. 
61  Id. 
62  Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of 
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands 
Question, 3 League of Nations O.J., Spec. Supp. 3, 6 (1920) [Hereinafter Aaland Islands Question]. 
63  DUGARD, supra note 53, at 140. 













government to pursue [peoples’] political, economic, social and cultural 
development,” do not give rise to a valid claim to secession.65 
Critically, there appears to be little scholarly or judicial consensus on 
the scope and severity of infringements upon “meaningful access to 
government” required to justify a people’s right to external self-
determination.66 Some scholars find a pattern of state practice justifying 
external self-determination by non-colonial peoples only in light of in 
extremis violations of human rights.67 This restriction would eliminate the 
right to external self-determination in all but the most severe cases of 
human-rights abuses, such as genocide or war crimes targeting a particular 
people.68 However, a more lenient standard might be construed to imply a 
legal right to secession in any case where constituent peoples of a state 
believe that their state’s government is structurally inadequately 
representative and provides insufficient “access to government … [for] the 
pursuit of political, economic, social, and cultural development.”69 
III. DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDE A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE 
SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD OF DONETSK AND LUGANSK? 
Two inquiries govern the issue of DPR and LPR statehood. First, they 
need to meet international legal criteria for statehood. As neither entity has 
been recognized by another recognized nation,70 both entities fail the 
                                                        
65  Quebec, supra note 46, at ¶ 138. 
66  See Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession in International Law and 
Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions: Textual Content and Legal Effects, 41 Denv. J. Int’l. L. & 
Pol’y. 345, 394 (2013). 
67  See id. at 395 (finding that “state practice in terms of recognition only supports [non-
colonial] secession when the people within the seceding entity have been subject to oppression in 
extremis”) and Berlin, supra note 52, at 70 (observing that opinio juris and state practice establish that 
“only the qualified right to [“non-colonial”] secession coupled with human rights abuses deemed as in 
extremis has been able to find support under customary international law”). 
68  Berlin, supra note 52, at 70. 
69  Quebec, supra note 46, at ¶ 138. 
70  See Alec Luhn, Ukraine’s Rebel ‘People’s Republics’ Begin Work of Building New States, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 6, 2014, 9:02 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/ukraine-
rebel-peoples-republic-states (indicating that “The two ‘people’s republics’ carved out over the past 
seven months by pro-Russia rebels have not been recognised [sic] by any countries.”) However, the 
DPR and LPR have been officially recognized by South Ossetia, itself a partially-recognized state. 
South Ossetia Recognizes Independence of Donetsk People’s Republic, TASS (June 27, 2014, 8:37 
PM), http://tass.ru/en/world/738110. Additionally, Russia has provisionally and “temporarily 
recognize[d] civil registration documents issued in separatist-held areas of eastern Ukraine,” including 
“identity documents, diplomas, birth and marriage certificates, and vehicle registration plates issued in 
the eastern Ukraine regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.” Maria Kiselyova & Pavel Polityuk, Putin 
Orders Russia to Recognize Documents Issued in Rebel-Held East Ukraine, Reuters (Feb. 18, 2017, 
 












constitutive theory of statehood.71 However, under current norms of 
international law, the Montevideo criteria provide a sound basis for the 
evaluation of an entity’s statehood.72 Therefore, the criteria-based inquiry 
for Donetsk and Lugansk will center on their satisfaction of Montevideo 
criteria. 
Second, Donetsk and Lugansk will need sufficient justification to 
override the “sacrosanct” principles of territorial integrity which stand in 
opposition to a unilateral secessionist movement’s legitimacy, even when 
that movement satisfies the Montevideo factors.73 The right of self-
determination may provide Donetsk and Lugansk with sufficient legal 
rationale for secession. However, that rationale only applies if Ukraine has 
so drastically infringed on Donbass residents’ rights to internal self-
determination that secession – external self-determination – becomes 
justifiable. 
 
A. Montevideo Criteria 
 
In order to accrue the rights of independent states, Donetsk and 
Lugansk need to meet basic criteria for statehood.74 As noted in Part IIA 
above, international law typically considers an entity’s de facto 
sovereignty, often by reference to the four criteria established in the 
Montevideo Convention: permanent population, defined territory, 
government, and the ability to conduct external relations with other 
states.75 If Donetsk or Lugansk lack any of these four factors, then no legal 
argument for their statehood may be sustained.76 However, because each 
criterion is vaguely defined, “‘…[i]nternational law does not impose rigid 
or arbitrary quantitative criteria when it comes to [their] requirements.’”77 
Therefore, “when looking at each criterionindividually, it becomes evident 
that their classical definition is viewed more as a flexible legal rule rather 
than a rule of law strictu sensu.”78 
                                                                                                                              
10:34 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-documents/putin-orders-russia-to-
recognize-documents-issued-in-rebel-held-east-ukraine-idUSKBN15X0KR. 
71  See Crawford, supra note 42 at ¶ 44 (explicitly disclaiming recognition by other states as a 
determinative criterion for statehood in international law.) 
72  Id. 
73  Quebec, supra note 46, at ¶ 138. 
74  Supra Part IIA. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Berlin, supra note 51, at 44. 













The first requirement under the Montevideo standard is a permanent 
population.79 Although, given the flexible interpretive guidelines applied 
for Montevideo criteria, “a permanent population does not need to be a 
constant one,”80 a flexible analysis is not necessary in this case because 
both Donetsk and Lugansk indisputably contain permanent populations.81 
Although the ongoing war has displaced a large number of Donbass 
residents – the UN suggests as many as 2 million people have been 
displaced within Ukraine, with over 100,000 fleeing abroad82 – many 
millions more continue to live in the region.83 Thus, both proto-states 
satisfy this criterion.84 
The second Montevideo requirement is a defined territory.85 Donetsk 
and Lugansk are unable to satisfy a strict interpretation of this 
requirement, as the borders of both separatist regions have shifted 
repeatedly over the course of the war.86 But the defined territory 
                                                        
79  Montevideo Convention, supra note 45, art. 1. 
80  Anderson, supra note 13, at 14. 
81  See Population (by Estimate) as of December 1, 2018. Average Annual Populations January-
November 2018, State Statistics Service of Ukraine, last updated Jan. 23, 2019, 
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2018/ds/kn/kn_e/kn1118_e.html. The estimated population 
of Donetsk Oblast on December 1, 2018 was approximately 4.16 million people. Id. The estimated 
population of Lugansk Oblast at that time was 2.15 million people. Id. Although the DPR and LPR do 
not control their entire namesake oblasts, major population centers (such as Donetsk, Lugansk, and 
Gorlovka) remain in separatist control. See Live Universal Awareness Map, Ukraine, (live updates, 
retrieved Nov. 4, 2018), https://liveuamap.com/ (providing up-to-date maps of borders between 
Ukrainian and separatist territory). 
82  UNHCR, Ukraine Refugee Crisis, https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine. See also 
Cynthia Buckley, Ralph Clem, Jarod Fox, and Erik Herron, The War in Ukraine is more Devastating 
than you Know, Washington Post (April 9, 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2018/04/09/the-war-in-ukraine-is-more-devastating-than-you-know (reporting that “[n]early 
two million people have been internally displaced or put at risk if they remain in their homes.”). 
83  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Donetsk Region, https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-
ukraine/info/regions/25-doneck (indicating a prewar population of 5 million people in Donetsk) and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Luhansk Region, https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-
ukraine/info/regions/26-lugansk (indicating a prewar population of approximately 2.5 million people 
in Lugansk). 
84  See Montevideo Convention, supra note 45, art. 1. 
85  Montevideo Convention, supra note 45, art. 1. 
86  See BBC, Ukraine Crisis in Maps (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
27308526 (providing maps which show the fluctuating borders of the separatist movements from May 
2014 to February 2015) and Live Universal Awareness Map, supra note 79 (providing up-to-date 
renderings of the border between territory held by DPR and LPR separatists and the Ukrainian 
government.) For comparison, see the maps below; the first from early 2015, see BBC, Ukraine Crisis 
 












requirement “does not mean … that there must be an absence of disputed 
frontiers.”87 There is no requirement that the territory be any particular 
size,88 nor that it be contiguous.89 Instead, “The only requirement is that 
the State must consist of a certain coherent territory effectively 
governed.”90 If the new state’s borders are in a state of flux, it must “make 
                                                                                                                              
in Maps, and the second current as of the time of writing this note see Live Universal Awareness Map, 
 
supra note 84.  
87  Anderson, supra note 13, at 15. 
88  Crawford, supra note 42, at ¶ 15. Crawford notes that, for example, “Vatican City and 
Monaco occupy less than two square kilometres of territory. Id. 
89  Id. at ¶ 16. 













clear to the international community which territory it has claimed and 
maintain fidelity to the claim's specific nature.”91 
The DPR and LPR borders have remained largely intact, particularly 
since the signing of the First Minsk Protocol in September 2014.92 The 
names of the breakaway republics also give notice of the states’ territorial 
ambitions: the Donetsk Peoples’ Republic claims a portion of  Donetsk 
Oblast, and the Lugansk People’s Republic claims a portion of Luhansk 
Oblast.93 Because both breakaway regions have maintained fairly well-
defined borders with Ukraine (and firmly fixed borders with Russia, their 
only other neighbor), they likely satisfy the second Montevideo criterion.94 
To satisfy the third Montevideo criterion, the purported state must have 
a government.95 This is a two-part inquiry: first, whether there is “a 
political, executive, and legal structure for the purpose of regulating the 
                                                        
91  Anderson, supra note 13, at 16. 
92  Compare BBC, supra note 89, and Live Universal Awareness Map, supra note 84 (showing 
that the map of the Minsk I ceasefire and the modern map share the same general shape, with the 
border beginning on the Azov shore between Mariupol and Novoazovsk, continuing north to the west 
of Donetsk and Gorlovka, before curving eastward, north of Lugansk, and then southeast to the 
Russian border; the largest notable difference is that Debaltsevo, held by Ukraine under the Minsk I 
plan, is currently under the control of the Donetsk People’s Republic.) 
93  In May 2014, the separatist groups attempted a confederation of their respective proto-states 
under the name “Novorossiya.” See Donetsk, Lugansk People’s Republics Unite in Novorossiya, THE 
VOICE OF RUSSIA (May 24, 2014, 7:58 PM), archived at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140607011548/http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_05_24/Donetsk-
Lugansk-Peoples-Republics-unite-in-Novorossiya-1012/ (reporting that “the two republics have signed 
their merger in one state, Novorossiya.”). This might raise a question as to whether the borders of the 
states as separate entities are sufficiently fixed to pass Montevideo standards. However, the 
Novorossiya project collapsed just shy of a year later. See Andrei Kolesnikov, Why the Kremlin is 
Shutting Down the Novorossiya Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (May 29, 2015), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/05/29/why-kremlin-is-shutting-down-novorossiya-project/i96u 
(reporting that “On May 20, the leaders of the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LNR and 
DNR) announced the abandonment of the Novorossiya project, a hypothetical confederation of states 
in southeastern Ukraine stretching from Kharkiv to Odessa.”). It is unclear whether any de jure 
structures were established under the imprimatur of the Novorossiyan state, and apparent that there 
was no de facto unified governance of the DPR and LPR territories; Alexander Borodai, former prime 
minister of the DPR, referred to Novorossiya as “a false start … an idea, a dream.” Ex-Prime Minister 
of Unrecognized Donetsk Republic: There’s No ‘Novorossiya’, but a False Start, BELSAT (January 2, 
2015), https://belsat.eu/en/news/ex-prime-minister-unrecognised-donetsk-republic-theres-no-
novorossiya-its-false-start/. Thus the theorized Novorossiya, though announced as an intentional 
project, never disrupted the de jure or de facto control of the DPR or LPR over their respective 
territories. 
94  Compare BBC, supra note 89, and Live Universal Awareness Map, supra note 84, see also 
included maps, supra note 89. (showing that the DPR and LPR have unchanged borders with Russia, 
and that their borders with Ukraine and with one another have shifted very little since their secessions.) 
95  Montevideo Convention, supra note 45, art. 1. 












population,” and second, whether that structure is “effective, which means 
that it must be able to project authority throughout the population.”96  
This principle is exemplified in the 1923 Tinoco Arbitration between 
Great Britain and Costa Rica.97 In that case, Costa Rica objected to the 
legal claims of some British nationals to a concession for an oil claim 
within the country, granted by Costa Rica’s prior government regime.98 In 
1917, the Costa Rican secretary of war, Frederico Tinoco,99 overthrew the 
government of President Alfredo Gonzalez,100 and ruled until August of 
1919,101 when Tinoco fled to exile.102 Costa Rica asserted that the Tinoco 
regime was “not a de facto or de jure government according to the rules of 
international law,” and that it was not required to honor any commitments 
made by that regime.103 Chief Justice Taft, the arbitrator in the case, 
considered it “well settled international law” with “universal 
acquiescence” that a change to a state’s internal political order, even by a 
military coup, does not render the new regime legally incapable of 
exercising the nation’s rights and fulfilling its responsibilities under 
international law.104 He found as a general principle of international law 
that: 
Changes in the government or the internal policy of a state do 
not as a rule affect its position in international law. A monarchy 
may be transformed into a republic or a republic into a 
monarchy; absolute principles may be substituted for 
constitutional, or the reverse; but, though the government 
changes, the nation remains, with rights and obligations 
unimpaired.105 
The relevant consideration is whether the government effectively 
exerted its power in fact.106 Taft notes that “[n]o other government of any 
kind asserted power in the country. The courts sat, Congress legislated, 
and the government was duly administered. Its power was fully 
                                                        
96  Anderson, supra note 13, at 22. 
97  Aguilar Armory and Royal Bank of Canada Claims (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), 1 U.N. 
Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 369 (1923). 
98  Id. at 371. 
99  Id. at 376. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. at 377. 
104  Id. 
105  Id., quoting Dr. John Basset Moore, 1 Digest of Int’l Law 249. 













established and peaceably exercised.”107 If a purported government 
exercises its authority with the acquiescence of the people – if it comprises 
a “link in the continuity of the government” of that nation – it must be 
considered a legitimate government under international law.108 
Some scholars propose that the government requirement is relaxed 
when internal self-determination has been violated;109 such an analysis is 
unnecessary in this case.110 Both Donetsk111 and Lugansk112 exhibit de jure 
structures of government, including written constitutions113 and elected 
legislatures.114 As for de facto governance over their territory, the Donetsk 
People’s Republic issues passports115 and license plates,116 changed the 
local currency,117 and changed “the school curriculum … from Ukrainian 
to Russian”.118 The situation in Lugansk is more difficult to ascertain from 
outside the region, as “[v]ery few outsiders and journalists have been 
allowed access since autumn 2015.”119 However, control over the borders 
                                                        
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 380. 
109  See Anderson, supra note 13 at 22-44 (discussing the exceptions to the effective government 
criterion in light of violations of a people’s right to self-determination), but see Berlin, supra note 52, 
at 46 (indicating that “this interpretation has not been universally accepted by contemporary legal 
scholarship” and that some international law scholars regard effective governance over territory as 
essential for the factual existence of a state.) 
110  Although it is unnecessary in this case to analyze whether violations of self-determination 
obviate the need to satisfy the effective governance Montevideo criterion, a determination of whether 
Ukraine has violated the self-determination right of Donbass residents is relevant to the overall 
argument for the legal validity of the Donetsk and Lugansk secessions; see Part IIIB infra. 
111  See generally PEOPLE’S COUNCIL OF THE DONETSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, 
https://dnrsovet.su/en/# (providing information and citizen services for the Donetsk People’s Republic) 
(last visited Month-Date-Year). 
112  See generally OFFICIAL SITE OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE LUGANSK PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC, https://sovminlnr.ru/ (providing legislative and regulatory information about the LPR). 
113  See DONETSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, CONSTITUTION OF THE DONETSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
(May 14, 2014, amended Dec. 29, 2017), https://dnrsovet.su/konstitutsiya, and  Self-Proclaimed 
Lugansk People’s Republic Elects Head, Passes Constitution, RT (May 19 , 2014, 3:56 AM), 
https://www.rt.com/news/159840-lugansk-elects-head-constitution. 
114  Donetsk, for example, has a 100-member People’s Council currently split between two 
political parties. PEOPLE’S COUNCIL OF THE DONETSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, HISTORY OF THE DPR 
PEOPLE’S COUNCIL, https://dnrsovet.su/history-of-dpr-people-s-council. 
115  ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ Seeks Sense of Nationhood, AL JAZEERA NEWS (Feb. 17 2017), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/donetsk-people-republic-seeks-sense-nationhood-
170217043602195.html. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Christopher Miller, What in The World Is Going On in the Russia-Backed Separatist Luhansk 
‘Republic’? RADIO FREE EUROPE / RADIO LIBERTY (Nov. 22, 2017, 4:39 PM), 
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-luhansk-armed-masked-men-what-is-going-on-kornet-
plotnitsky/28870308.html. 












– and the apparent exercise of police authority within Lugansk – imply 
effective territorial control by the secessionists.120 In the event that 
Ukraine were to reclaim the Donbass, it may be in a similar position as the 
Costa Rican government following the Tinoco regime: the international 
community, following international law, would not indemnify it for any 
external debts or liabilities incurred under the rule of the separatist 
regimes.121 Thus, the DPR and LPR possess sufficient governments de 
jure and de facto to suffice for Montevideo statehood analysis. 
Finally, the fourth Montevideo criterion is the ability to enter relations 
with other states, or “capacity.”122 Some scholars hold that “this criterion 
is actually a combination of both the effective government criterion and a 
‘fifth’ criterion of independence.”123 Others reject the capacity criterion 
altogether, characterizing it as “a consequence, rather than a condition of 
statehood.”124 International law scholars emphasize the relative importance 
of the “independence” factor over the “capacity” factor, given that 
capacity may follow from statehood rather than comprising a prerequisite 
for it – that is, an entity without any one or more of the necessary qualities 
of statehood, such as a defined territory or a people, would be unable to 
conduct external affairs as a consequence of that deficiency.125 
The scholarly consensus indicates that “the independence criterion 
possesses two aspects: formal and actual independence.”126 Formal 
independence means that the state’s “powers of government are derived 
from domestic law” and represented by a material indicator “such as the 
adoption of a constitution, formation of a provisional government, 
declaration of independence, or establishment of a sovereign 
                                                        
120  Id. 
121  See Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 369 (1923). However, the 
Tinoco case and a postulated reunited Ukraine post-pacification of the Donbass can be factually 
distinguished from one another. In Ukraine, only part of the entire sovereign nation is held by de facto 
authorities; in Tinoco, the entire country was willfully subject to the purportedly-illegitimate 
government. Id. at 379. Thus, Ukraine could plausibly advance two arguments to counter claims by 
creditors to the DPR and LPR: first, of course, that the DPR and LPR were illegitimate governments 
who could not properly accrue obligations to external entities; and second, that even if they were 
legitimate governments, that they were legitimate governments for other sovereign countries, and thus 
the debts would devolve to future successor states (or to nobody) rather than to Ukraine. 
122  Montevideo Convention, supra note 45, art. 1. 
123  Berlin, supra note 52, at 47. 
124  Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 403, 434 (1999) (quoting Ingrid Detter, The International Legal Order 43 
(1994)). 
125  Berlin, supra note 52, at 47-48. 













legislature.”127 Both Donetsk and Lugansk have promulgated constitutions, 
established governments, and convened legislatures.128 Because of these 
representations, they satisfy the formal independence requirement. 
The second prong of the independence requirement is actual 
independence, “meaning that its decisions and actions must be its own.”129 
Because this criterion is determinative of the nascent state’s ability to 
conduct external affairs, scholars generally treat it as a prerequisite for the 
capacity criterion of the Montevideo test.130 This factor poses an obstacle 
to DPR and LPR statehood. A state occupied by a foreign power is not 
independent; and “a state . . . designed to conceal the sovereign control of 
another state, will not satisfy the test of actual independence.”131 The 
separatist movements in the Donbass are supported by the Russian 
Federation,132 several early leaders of the secession movement are former 
Russian soldiers,133 and Russian troops may participate in the fighting.134 
Both regions have received frequent and large aid shipments from Russia 
since August 2014.135  
The extent of Russian control over the DPR and LPR is unclear. A 
Ukraine-based hacker collective released a cache of emails, allegedly from 
Putin ally Vladislav Surkov, that includes previously non-public 
intelligence regarding the prosecution of the conflict in the Donbass, 
                                                        
127  Id. 
128  See Part IIIA, supra, at 12 n. 116. 
129  Anderson, supra note 13, at 45. 
130  Berlin, supra note 52 at 48. 
131  Anderson, supra note 13, at 46. 
132  See Luke Harding, Ukraine Ceasefire Leave Frontline Counting Cost of War in Uneasy 
Calm, THE GUARDIAN (Dec.17, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/17/ukraine-
ceasefire-frontline-counting-cost-war-uneasy-calm (asserting that Russia “gave political and military 
support to the east’s anti-Kiev rebellion”); Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Novorossiya Theory Meets 
Novorossiya Reality in Donetsk, THE INTERPRETER (July 8, 2014),  (detailing a press conference with a 
Russian politician and Donbass separatists, including a dispute over the number and quality of arms 
provided to the Donbass militants by Russia.).  
133  Igor Strelkov, for example, is a Russian former intelligence operative who led early efforts to 
carve out a separatist foothold in the eastern city of Slovyansk. Paul Sonne and Philip Shishkin, Pro-
Russian Commander in Eastern Ukraine Sheds Light on Origin of Militants, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(April 26, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pro-russian-commander-in-eastern-ukraine-sheds-light-
on-origin-of-militants-1398553364. 
134  For example, one ongoing controversy surrounds the origin and crew of a Buk surface-to-air 
missile launcher which shot down the civilian passenger flight MH17 in 2014. Russia maintains that 
“no Russian weapons were taken to Ukraine,” but a Dutch criminal investigation determined that the 
missile launcher was brought into separatist territory from Russia and returned the day after the attack. 
BBC News, MH17 Missile ‘Came From Russia’, Dutch-Led Investigators Say (Sep. 28, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37495067. 
135  See TASS, Aid Convoy from Russian Emergencies Ministry Arrives in Donbass (May 8, 
2018), http://tass.com/politics/1003258. TASS reports that the May delivery is the 76th Russian aid 
convoy to the Donbass in the 48 months since August 2014. Id.  












including the record of a Russian paratrooper casualty in the conflict and a 
list of DPR political appointees sent to Surkov prior to the public 
announcement of those appointments.136 The Russian government claims 
that the emails are fake.137 Other evidence of Russian influence in the DPR 
and LPR is extensive, but circumstantial as regards direct control of 
governmental functions.138 Given the principle that the Montevideo factors 
should be applied flexibly, such sparse circumstantial evidence may not 
undermine the argument for DPR and LPR statehood. 
 
B. Punitive Measures as Constructive Recognition of a Right to 
External Self-Determination 
 
Although the Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples’ Republics plausibly meet 
the Montevideo criteria for statehood,139 the legal legitimacy of their 
secessions cannot rest on that basis alone.140 The territorial integrity of 
states is an unquestioned norm of international law141; in some contexts, as 
in the use of force for the purpose of conquest, protection of states’ 
territorial integrity is a jus cogens norm, the concern of all states and 
                                                        
136  Andrew E. Kramer, Ukrainian Hackers Release Emails Tying Top Russian Official to 
Uprising, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2016,) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/europe/ukraine-
russia-emails.html.  
137  Id. 
138  The report “Putin. War,” compiled from materials collected by Boris Nemtsov, alleges that 
“the DPR and LPR are under the external management of official Moscow, and key decisions about 
them depend on Russian bureaucrats and political consultants.” BORIS NEMTSOV ET. AL., PUTIN. WAR 
51 (2015). Boris Nemtsov was a politician and journalist in Russia well known for opposing Vladimir 
Putin’s policies in general and Russian involvement in Ukraine in particular; he was murdered under 
mysterious circumstances in Moscow on February 27, 2015. See Howard Amos & David Millward, 
Leading Putin Critic Gunned Down in Moscow, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 28, 2015), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11441466/Veteran-Russian-opposition-
politician-shot-dead-in-Moscow.html. The report names several figures in official leadership positions 
in the DPR and LPR who are Russian citizens, often with ties to Russian military or intelligence 
organs, and quotes one-time DPR Prime Minister (and alleged former Russian security service officer) 
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binding upon them.142 Overcoming Ukraine’s legal right to territorial 
integrity would require the assertion of a coequal right in opposition.143 
The right to self-determination may provide the basis for that 
assertion.144 As noted above, the right of peoples to self-determination is a 
recognized general principle of international law.145 The right to self-
determination is typically construed as two separate rights – “internal” 
self-determination, or the protection of the rights of national minorities, 
and “external” self-determination, or secession.146 Internal self-
determination refers to “the protection of minority rights within a state.”147 
This right is so fundamental in international law that it possesses an “erga 
omnes character” – it is binding between each and every state, and its 
violation by one state provides valid legal basis for any other state to 
require remedy.148 Self-determination of peoples is “one of the essential 
principles of contemporary international law.”149 However, despite the 
broad implications of a “right to self-determination of peoples,” the right 
does not give rise to a unilateral at-will justification for secession of any 
group defined as a “people;”150 such an interpretation would completely 
eradicate the territorial integrity of states, another bedrock principle of 
international law.151 Thus, the right of self-determination permits unilateral 
secession only in specific circumstances.152 The prevailing formulation of 
those circumstances was promulgated by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
its advisory opinion regarding the legality of the secession of Quebec; the 
Court held that:  
[A] right to secession only arises under the principle of self-
determination of people at international law where “a people” is 
governed as part of a colonial empire; where “a people” is 
subject to alien subjugation; and possibly where “a people” is 
                                                        
142  Id. at 123. Dugard notes that exceptions to the jus cogens character of the territorial integrity 
norm arise not from situations where it is less important, but in cases of consensual cession of territory 
by one state to another, which do not implicate the interests of other states. Id. 
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denied any meaningful access to its right of self-determination 
within the state of which it forms a part. 153 
Unless any of those conditions are satisfied, “peoples are expected to 
achieve self-determination within the framework of their existing state.”154 
Donetsk and Lugansk under Ukrainian rule cannot be said to be subject 
to a colonial empire, despite the separatists’ objections to the legitimacy of 
the current Kyiv government; they were peaceably subject to Ukrainian 
sovereignty for over twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union,155 and 
were administratively part of the Ukrainian SSR prior to that time.156 Nor 
are the Donbass oblasts subject to alien subjugation; although the Donbass 
identity is discrete from both pure Ukrainian and pure Russian ethnic 
identity, it integrates both of them, and many residents of Donbass identify 
as either Ukrainian or both Ukrainian and Russian.157 If the Donetsk and 
Lugansk secessions have any legal legitimacy on the basis of self-
determination, it must be due to deprivation of “meaningful access to 
government to pursue their political, economic, cultural, and social 
development.”158 
It would be difficult to make a case for this deprivation in early 2014, 
when the DPR and LPR seceded.159 The inciting incident for the 
secessions was the flight of President Yanukovych from the country and 
the fall of the Donbass-based Party of Regions from power.160 However, 
post-Euromaidan measures in Kyiv may undermine the self-determination 
of Donbass Russophones. For example, in 2017, the Ukrainian 
government passed a bill requiring that Ukrainian be the sole language of 
instruction (except for foreign language classes) from the fifth grade on; 
previously, schools could teach in minority languages such as Russian or 
Hungarian in minority communities.161 Ukraine has also banned the import 
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of books from Russia, as well “restricted access to “anti-Ukrainian 
content” from Russia.”162 In 2018, the Ukrainian Supreme Court 
overturned a 2012 law which permitted national minorities in their home 
regions to transact official business with the government, including 
education and interactions with the legal system, in their native 
language.163 These appear to comprise a campaign of hostility to Ukrainian 
Russophones; one spokesperson for a political figure from a Hungarian-
minority region of Ukraine noted that “We understand that this law is 
primarily directed against the Russian language, because it dominates the 
capital, the eastern regions … This law is aimed at protecting the 
Ukrainian language, but mostly against Russian.”164 
There is no international consensus on the degree of deprivation of 
internal self-determination which would justify secession.165 The ICJ 
avoided the question in the Kosovo case by ruling on the legality of 
declaring independence rather than exercising it.166 The Quebec case flatly 
states that the Quebecois do not meet the standard.167 
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Donbass separatists will encounter two problems in invoking self-
determination: first, the deprivation simply may not be severe enough to 
create a right of secession.168 Second, rights to secession may be 
determined ex ante (then, as noted above, they were not deprived of self-
determination,)169 ex post (in which case the developing political situation 
will be determinative,) or as a developing threshold (in which case the 
legal question will revert to the severity analysis of the first issue as each 
new punitive measure against the Donbass is enacted.)170 
CONCLUSION 
The Donbass conflict poses two outstanding legal questions: first, do 
Montevideo-complete states which illegally secede accrue the rights of 
statehood? Second, what type and extent of deprivations of internal self-
determination justify secession of a “people?” 
The Donbass conflict may not provide answers. Because customary 
international law requires both agreement to a rule by states (or “opinio 
juris”) and practice of the rule due to its legally-binding nature (or “state 
practice,”) they cannot be created or imposed without the consent of 
states;171 as a result, “the mere textual articulation of a qualified right to 
UNC [“unilateral non-colonial”] secession in declaratory General 
Assembly resolutions, without other concomitant state practice, such as 
grants of recognition in response to UNC secessionist disputes, will not 
constitute a binding rule of customary international law.” 172 However, in 
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the event that the conflicts are not quietly settled in the political arena, 
adjudication of the DPR and LPR secessions may provide a basis for 
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